



Android Security

Key Management

Roberto Gassirà (r.gassira@mseclab.com)

Roberto Piccirillo (r.piccirillo@mseclab.com)





- Senior Security Analyst - Mobile Security Lab
 - Vulnerability Assessment (IT, Mobile Application)
 - Hijacking Mobile Data Connection
 - BlackHat Europe 2009
 - DeepSec Vienna 2009
 - HITB Amsterdam 2010
 - Android Secure Development



[@robpicone](https://twitter.com/robpicone)



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- IpTrack Developer



@robgas



- Key Management e CryptoSystem
- Mobile Application: protezione dei dati
- Key Management in Android e sue evoluzioni
- Keychain e AndroidKeyStore
- Tipologie di AndroidKeyStore
- Codelab
 - Generazione chiave pubblica/privata
 - Accesso AndroidKeyStore
 - Digital signature e Encryption

Key Management



"Key management is the management of cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem."





- *"refers to a suite of algorithms needed to implement a particular form of encryption and decryption"*

- Tipologie di encryption:
 - Symmetric Key Algorithms
 - Identical encryption key for encryption/decryption
 - Asymmetric Key Algorithms
 - Different key for encryption/decryption






- Protezione dati riservati
 - Dati dell'applicazione
 - Dati su */sdcard*
 - Chiavi di cifratura
- Scambio sicuro di dati
 - Documento
 - Mail
 - SMS
 - Chiave di sessione
- Firma digitale
 - Documento
 - Mail





- Application Level

- ~~○ File nell'applicazione (Shared Prefs, File, ...)~~
- ~~○ Code Obfuscation~~
- ~~○ Generazione a run-time~~



forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=2525552

[SECURITY] Multiple Android Superuser vulnerabilities

cernekee 13th November 2013, 08:16 PM

Member - OP
Thanks Meter 126
Posts: 82
Join Date: Jun 2013

[SECURITY] Multiple Android Superuser vulnerabilities

Well, I was going to hold off until all of the vendors had new releases posted, but now that **the cat is out of the bag** and the evildoers have sufficient information to figure out what got fixed:

Current Superuser/SuperSU releases have security holes that allow any application to execute commands as root without the user's permission (even apps with no permissions). Please upgrade immediately to SuperSU >= v1.69 or another patched release.

This is expected to impact the vast majority of rooted devices and custom ROMs.

Details follow:

Superuser unsanitized environment vulnerability on Android <= 4.2.x

Vulnerable releases of several common Android Superuser packages may allow malicious Android without notifying the device owner:

- ChainsDD Superuser (current releases, including v3.1.3)
- CyanogenMod/ClockWorkMod/Koush Superuser (current releases, including v1.0.2.1)
- Chainfire SuperSU prior to v1.69



- "User" level


- PBKDF2 (Password Based Key Derivation Function)
 - Algoritmo di generazione (**PBEWithSHA256And256BitAES-CBC-BC**)
 - Salt
 - Numero di Iterazioni

- System Level

- KeyChain (da ≥ 4.0)
- AndroidKeyStore (ufficiale da ≥ 4.3)



- KeyChain
 - Accessibile da qualunque applicazione




- AndroidKeyStore
 - **Accessibile alla singola applicazione ed al singolo utente**
 - Memorizza **solo** coppia chiave pubblica/privata RSA 2048

Key Management Evolution



API LEVEL 14

Global Level Only:
Default TrustStore
cacerts.bks
(ROOTED device)



Global Level:
KeyChain
(**Public API**)


App Level:
KeyStore
(**Closed API**)



API LEVEL 18



Global Level:
KeyChain
(**Public API**)

App Level and
per User Level:
AndroidKeyStore
(**Public API**)





- Due tipologie di Storage
 - Hardware-backed (Nexus 7, Nexus 4, Nexus 5 :-) con OS \geq 4.3)
 - Secure Element
 - TPM
 - TrustZone
 - Software only (Rimanenti dispositivi con OS \geq 4.3)





KeyChain enhancements

The KeyChain API now provides a method that allows applications to confirm that system-wide keys are bound to a **hardware root of trust** for the device. This provides a place to create or store private keys that **cannot be exported** off the

```
import android.security.KeyChain;
```

```
if (KeyChain.isBoundKeyAlgorithm("RSA"))
```

```
    // Hardware-Backed
```

```
else
```

```
    // Software Only
```



AndroidKeyStore in pratica



CodeLab diviso in 4 step:

1. Generazioni Chiavi
2. Accesso AndroidKeyStore
3. Firma e Verifica
4. Cifratura/Decifratura

Definizione Specifiche Certificato



```
Context cx = getActivity();  
String pkg = cx.getPackageName();
```

```
Calendar notBefore = Calendar.getInstance();  
Calendar notAfter = Calendar.getInstance();  
notAfter.add(1, Calendar.YEAR);
```

Definizione Parametri
Temporali

```
import android.security.KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder;  
Builder builder = new KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder(cx);  
builder.setAlias("DEVKEY1");  
String infocert = String.format("CN=%s, OU=%s", "DEVKEY1", pkg);  
builder.setSubject(new X500Principal(infocert));  
builder.setSerialNumber(BigInteger.ONE);  
builder.setStartDate(notBefore.getTime());  
builder.setEndDate(notAfter.getTime());
```

ALIAS per indicizzare
il certificato

Self-Signed X.509

- Common Name (CN)
- Subject (OU)
- Serial Number

```
KeyPairGeneratorSpec spec = builder.build();
```

Generazione delle specifiche del
Certificato

Generazione chiave pubblica/privata



```
KeyPairGenerator kpGenerator;
```

Engine per generazione
chiave Privata/Pubblica

```
kpGenerator = KeyPairGenerator  
.getInstance("RSA", "AndroidKeyStore");
```

Istanza Engine con:

- Algoritmo RSA
- Provider: AndroidKeyStore

```
kpGenerator.initialize(spec);
```

Init Engine con le specifiche del certificato

```
KeyPair kp;  
kp = kpGenerator.generateKeyPair();
```

- Generazione chiave Privata/Pubblica

**Dopo la generazione, le chiavi saranno memorizzate in
Android Key Store e potranno essere recuperate mediante l'ALIAS**

Inizializzazione Android Key Store



```
keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore");
```

Richiesta di Android Key Store

```
keyStore.load(null);
```

Dovrebbe essere utilizzato nel caso si ha un `InputStream` da caricare (per esempio il nome di un `KeyStore` importato). Se non invocato l'applicazione andrà in CRASH

Abbiamo il riferimento *keyStore* che utilizzeremo per accedere alla coppia chiave Pubblica/Privata mediante l'identificativo `ALIAS`



- Digital Signature

- Authentication, Non-Repudiation and Integrity
- RSA Private key to Sign
- RSA Public Key to Verify

```
KeyStore.Entry entry = ks.getEntry("DEVKEY1", null);
```

Accesso chiave Pubblica e Privata identificata dall'ALIAS==DEVKEY1

```
byte[] data = "DevFest Rome 2013!".getBytes();
```

```
Signature s = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withRSA");
```

Scelta dell'algoritmo

```
s.initSign(((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getPrivateKey());
```

Chiave Privata per firmare

```
s.update(data);  
byte[] signature = s.sign();  
String result = null;  
result = Base64.encodeToString(signature, Base64.DEFAULT);
```

Firma e codifica in Base64

Verify RSA Digital Signature



```
byte[] data = input.getBytes();  
byte[] signature;  
signature = Base64.decode(signatureStr, Base64.DEFAULT);
```

Decodifica Base64

```
KeyStore.Entry entry = ks.getEntry("DEVKEY1", null);
```

Accesso chiave Pubblica e Privata
identificata dall'ALIAS==DEVKEY1

```
Signature s = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withRSA");
```

Scelta dell'algoritmo

```
s.initVerify(((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getCertificate());
```

Chiave Pubblica nel
certificato utilizzata per
verificare

```
s.update(data);  
boolean valid = s.verify(signature);
```

TRUE == Verified
FALSE == Not Verified



- Encryption
 - Confidentiality
 - RSA Public key to Encrypt
 - RSA Private key to Decrypt

```
PublicKey publicKeyEnc = ((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry)  
                        .getCertificate().getPublicKey();
```

Accesso alla chiave pubblica per cifrare

```
String textToEncrypt = new String("DevFest Rome 2013");  
byte[] textToEncryptToByte = textToEncrypt.getBytes();  
Cipher encCipher = null;  
byte[] encryptedText = null;
```

```
encCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding");  
encCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, publicKeyEnc);
```

- Scelta algoritmo
- Encryption con chiave pubblica

```
encryptedText = encCipher.doFinal(textToEncryptToByte);
```

Testo Cifrato

RSA Decryption



```
Cipher decCipher = null;  
byte[] plainTextByte = null;
```

```
decCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding");
```

Scelta algoritmo

```
decCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,  
              ((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getPrivateKey());
```

Decryption con la chiave privata

```
plainTextByte = decCipher.doFinal(encryptedText);
```

Decryption con chiave privata


```
String plainText = new String(plainTextByte);
```

Testo decifrato

Si osserva che...



- Vari tipi di screen lock
- La scelta di screen lock impatta sulla persistenza delle chiavi generate
- Cambiando il tipo di screen lock le chiavi vengono cancellate



```
No key found under alias: DEVKEY1  
Exiting signData()...  
Signature: null
```



- La documentazione riporta

The KeyPair generator will create a self-signed certificate with the subject as its X.509v3 Subject Distinguished Name and as its X.509v3 Issuer Distinguished Name along with the other parameters specified with the `KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder`.

The self-signed X.509 certificate may be replaced at a later time by a certificate signed by a real Certificate Authority.

- Le chiavi non dovrebbero essere cancellate quando il tipo di screen lock viene cambiato dall'utente



- Device con Storage “Hardware-backed”

```
shell@grouper:/data $ su root
root@grouper:/data # cd /data/misc/keystore/user_0/
root@grouper:/data/misc/keystore/user_0 # ls -la
-rw----- keystore keystore      84 2013-11-08 06:15 .masterkey
-rw----- keystore keystore     804 2013-11-07 10:03 10069_USRCERT_DEVKEY1
-rw----- keystore keystore      84 2013-11-07 10:03 10069_USRPKEY_DEVKEY1
-rw----- keystore keystore     724 2013-11-07 11:01 10070_USRCERT_myKey
-rw----- keystore keystore      84 2013-11-07 11:01 10070_USRPKEY_myKey
root@grouper:/data/misc/keystore/user_0 #
```

- Device con Storage “Software-only”

```
root@generic:/ # cd /data/misc/keystore/user_0/
root@generic:/data/misc/keystore/user_0 # ls -la
-rw----- keystore keystore      84 2013-11-05 12:35 .masterkey
-rw----- keystore keystore     724 2013-11-05 13:04 10050_USRCERT_myKey
-rw----- keystore keystore    1524 2013-11-05 13:04 10050_USRPKEY_myKey
-rw----- keystore keystore      804 2013-11-08 01:16 10051_USRCERT_DEVKEY1
-rw----- keystore keystore    1524 2013-11-08 01:16 10051_USRPKEY_DEVKEY1
root@generic:/data/misc/keystore/user_0 #
```



- <http://developer.android.com/about/versions/android-4.3.html#Security>
- <http://developer.android.com/reference/java/security/KeyStore.html>
- <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption>
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature
- <http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2013/08/credential-storage-enhancements-android-43.html>
- <http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2012/05/storing-application-secrets-in-androids.html>
- <http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2012/04/using-password-based-encryption-on.html>
- <http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2011/11/ics-credential-storage-implementation.html>
- <http://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/KeyPairGeneratorSpec.html>



Grazie Q&A



www.mseclab.com
www.consulthink.it
research@mseclab.com

Requisiti



- Portatile
- Eclipse con ADT Plugin 22.3.0
- SDK Android 4.4 (API 19)
- Android SDK Build-tools 19

